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Abstract— Today, Android users are faced with several 
permissions' screens asking to access their personal information 
when using Android apps. In fact, Android users have to balance 
several considerations when choosing to grant or deny these data 
collection activities. Hence, it is important to understand how 
users' decisions are made and what factors play a role in users' 
decisions. A number of studies on the permissions' screens of 
Android devices have reported users discomfort and 
misunderstanding of the permission system. However, most 
studies were carried out on the old permission system where all 
permissions are presented at installation time, and the user has to 
either accept all the permissions or stop the installation. With the 
new permission system started with Android version 6.0 and 
higher, permissions are presented differently at run time. In this 
work, we aim to study users' disclosure decisions with the new 
run time system on Android. We have modeled users' disclosure 
decisions from three perspectives: dangerous permission type, 
clarity of rationale, and clarity of context. The study has been 
conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The results show that 
dangerous permission type as well as clarity of the context have a 
statistical significant effect on users' disclosure decisions. On the 
other hand, clarity of dangerous permission's rationale does not 
contribute significantly to users' decisions. These findings shed 
light upon important factors that users consider in making 
privacy decisions in the new Android run time model. Such 
factors should be taken into account by Android apps developers 
when requesting access to users' private information. 
Keywords— Android runtime, privacy policy, disclosure 
decisions, Android permissions  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Despite the fact that privacy is not a new issue for users, the 
issue is becoming more complex when associated with 
mobiles. Smartphones are increasingly integrated into people's 
lives. Large amount of users' personal data are produced and 
associated with users' activities on mobile devices. This 
increases the issue of privacy at different levels [1]. In addition, 
users' personal information has become the currency that is 
paid by mobile apps' users for several mobile services, such as 
entertainment and social networking apps. That is, mobile 
users often accept a number of permissions requests to access 
their personal data by mobile apps, to be able to use the apps 
properly. This personal information, such as contacts and call 
logs are used by mobile apps for different purposes and can be 
shared with different entities [2].  
Accessing to users' private data in Android is done through 
Android permissions system. In order for an Android app to be 
able to request authorization to users' personal data, the 
permissions must be declared in the app's manifest file. 
Starting from Android version 6.0 (Marshmallow), Google 
changed the Android permissions model (installation time 
model) that has been criticized for a long time. Instead of 
granting all permissions at installation time, permissions can be 
individually granted or denied at run time. When the app 
attempts to access user data that might affect user's privacy 
(dangerous permission), Android will present the permission 
screen. The user can then choose either to allow access to the 
data or deny the request. In Android Marshmallow and above, 
users can still use the app even after denying the requested 
permission, but maybe with limited functionality. Users can 
revoke the granted permissions whenever they want, using 
Android settings [3]. 
Many previous works have focused on surveying the issues 
associated with the Android permissions based model. 
However, most studies were carried out on the old permission 
system where all permissions are presented at installation time. 
With the new permission system started with Android version 
6.0 and higher, permissions are handled differently and users 
are given more control over dangerous permissions that affect 
their privacy. This work aims to benefit from this change by 
understanding how users' decisions are made and what factors 
play a role in users' decisions in the new Android permissions 
model.  
Drawing on Nissenbaum's theory of Privacy as Contextual 
Integrity [4], we investigate the impact of dangerous 
permission type, rationale of the dangerous permission 
(extracted from app's privacy policy), and the context of the 
dangerous permission request on user's disclosure decision. By 
examining the impact of dangerous permission type (contacts, 
location … etc.) on users' disclosure decisions, we aim to 
investigate the resources that users consider highly sensitive. 
This investigation should help developers to pay increased 
attention when requesting these permissions and only ask them 
when they are needed for the app to work. This study also 
investigates the impact of clarity of dangerous permission's 
rationale and context on users' disclosure decisions. Studying 
the rationale and context factors highlight to developers' 
attention when to request dangerous permissions and how 
obvious is the rationale as well as permission screen's triggered 
action. Finally, the study seeks to offer valuable insights for 
privacy policies writers into the importance of transparency in 
data handling practices described in apps' privacy policies and 
its impact on users' privacy decisions.  
Toward achieving our goal, we designed a prototype of an 
Android app and used a vignette survey to shed light upon 
some factors that could affect users' decision making process. 
We also asked users about their comfort level associated with 
each factor as an additional interesting finding. Based on the 
findings and lessons learned, we provided recommendations 
for developers in using the new permission system and how to 
help users to make more informed privacy decisions.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: The 
related work is detailed in Section II. The methodology is 
discussed in Section III. Sections IV and V detail the results 
and compare them to previous works. Finally, Section VI 
presents the conclusion, limitations and future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A considerable body of literature has been focused on 
studying users' perceptions, behavior and comfort of Android 
permissions system [5-9]. Several studies also have proposed 
extensions to Android permissions system and investigated 
their effect on users' privacy behaviors [10-12]. However, most 
of the past studies were carried out on the old Android 
permissions model (before Android version 6.0). As discussed 
previously, the old permissions model is totally different than 
the new one. Taking that into account, we are uncertain about 
the applicability of past studies' results to the new Android 
permissions model.  
A small amount of previous research recently compared the 
old Android permissions model with the new Android 
permissions model from users' perceptive. One such study 
compared the perception and usefulness of three permissions 
models: Old Android model, run time Android model and iOS 
permissions model [13]. The results showed that run time 
permissions are perceived as more useful and positive 
compared to the old Android model. Peruma et al. [14] 
examines users' perception and comprehension of the old and 
new Android permissions model. They found that users 
perceived the run time model to be slightly more secure than 
the install time model. The majority of users could recall the 
permissions requested in the Android run time model more 
than the install time model. 
Some research efforts studied users' satisfaction and 
concerns about the new Android run time permissions model. 
One such study [15] explored users' satisfaction with the 
usability and security of the Android run time model. Most 
users argued that they have more control over their personal 
data sharing in the run time model. Another study investigated 
users' perception and concerns toward the Android run time 
model by inspecting users' reviews to Android apps in the 
Google Play Store [16]. Issues related to the lack of 
permissions rationale messages were prominent in the reviews 
data. A recurrent issue was about bad request timing, meaning 
that apps ask for all permissions upfront, instead of following 
the new run time approach and ask for permissions when users 
invoke the related functionality.  
Considering that users' actual behavior might not reflect 
their words, a previous work [17] analyzed permissions data in 
Android devices with the run time model. Then, they compared 
the collected permissions data which represents users' actual 
behavior with users' reported privacy preferences. The results 
revealed that although users are more reluctant to allow 
specific dangerous permissions such as the microphone or 
camera, they granted these permissions to particular app 
categories. This is due to the fact that the gained benefits 
outweigh the potential risks, or what is called privacy calculus  
Closely related to our work [18], the authors investigated 
users' decision making in the Android run time model. They 
measured the approval and denial rates of permissions 
generally, and on each permission type individually. In 
summary, the approval rates of run time permissions requests 
(86%) far exceeded the denial rates. As per permission basis, 
the highest denial rate was associated with microphone access. 
The top reported reason behind denying run time permissions 
requests is that the permission looks irrelevant to the app's 
functionality. On the other hand, the top reported reason behind 
granting run time permissions requests is the user's desire to 
use a specific feature that requires this permission. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this study, we performed a between-subjects, full 
factorial vignette survey. Vignette surveys are widely used 
methods in many disciplines. They are employed to get deep 
insights into humans' decision making principles. Compared to 
direct questioning, vignette surveys minimize social 
desirability bias (SDB), as participants respond to hypothetical 
situations instead of stating their opinions explicitly. Such 
surveys are considered less prone to SDB especially in 
sensitive issues where attitudes are assessed indirectly [19,20]. 
The vignette study consists of a variety of vignettes. Vignettes 
are descriptions of objects or situations that are varied 
experimentally in order to elicit participants’ beliefs, attitudes, 
or intended behaviors [21].  
Our vignette study measures the impact of three 
independent variables: dangerous permission type, clarity of 
dangerous permission's rationale and clarity of dangerous 
permission's context on the dependent variable: disclosure 
decision. The study begins by showing participants a short 
description of the newly launched Android game app, 
Citymanage. Citymanage app wants players to build the best 
city in the world. The player, with the help of his group 
members, are responsible of constructing the city and 
managing everything related to it, including public 
transportation, schools and healthcare. The study then 
continues by showing how David, a fictional character, plays 
the app. This is done by presenting participants with a number 
of scenarios in which David uses the app. Here is an example 
of a scenario: "As with any new city, laws must be established. 
Deciding on which laws to activate first is a hard decision as it 
requires weighing up the advantages and disadvantages. Such 
decisions need to be discussed between group players. 
However, it is night time now and David decided to postpone 
the discussion to tomorrow morning at 10 am. He wanted to 
add this appointment to his calendar. He pressed the button 
(add to my calendar) and the following screen appeared". The 
dangerous permission, clarity of dangerous permission's 
rationale and clarity of dangerous permission's context differ in 
these scenarios. Participants are then asked about their 
disclosure decision in each scenario. 
Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
All participants were over 18 years old and have an Android 
device. Once participants accepted taking the survey, they were 
redirected to SurveyMonkey online survey tool. Participants 
took on average 4 minutes and 32 seconds to complete the 
survey. As the quality of the data obtained relies on the 
participants [22], we applied a number of qualification tests to 
ensure high quality data. First, we limited our participants to 
those with at least 1000 prior tasks accepted with 95% or 
greater approval rate. Second, we asked our participants to 
confirm that they have Android device and provide the version 
of their Android. If the provided version of Android is not 
correct, the response is rejected. Third, we included an 
attention question in the middle of the survey, stating: "I am 
randomly answering the survey" with a "Yes" or "No" answer. 
Responses answering "Yes" to this question were excluded, in 
order to reduce the risk of random responses. We also didn't 
allow the survey to be taken more than once from the same 
device. In total, 140 participants answered the survey. After 
running the quality and attention checks, we ended up with 119 
responses. Each participant was given $1.00 after successfully 
answering the survey. 
In the following subsections we outline how the rationales 
of the dangerous permissions were extracted. We also describe 
the decisions scenarios and survey development. Finally, 
prototype design is presented. 
A. Dangerous Permissions Rationales' Extraction 
Our dataset contains the top 100 Android apps from Google 
Play Store. The apps were chosen from all Google Play Store 
categories to assure saturation of dangerous permissions' 
rationales and diversity.  The privacy policies of these apps 
were downloaded and dangerous permissions' rationales were 
manually extracted. We choose to extract the rationales from 
real privacy policies which reflect actual apps practices related 
to users' personal information on Android.  
In order to extract the rationales of dangerous permissions, 
we used the list of keywords representing dangerous 
permissions from [23] and recorded all the dangerous 
permissions used by the apps and the associated rationale 
sentences, if any. The process of downloading privacy policies 
and extracting the rationales took place in September – 
November 2019.  
After that, the dangerous permissions' rationales were 
classified to clear and vague based on the following definition: 
"Ambiguity arise when a statement is incomplete and missing 
relevant information, or when a word or phrase has more than 
one possible interpretation and the reader is uncertain about 
which interpretation the author intended" [24]. In order to 
mitigate threats to construct validity, two other researchers 
independently participated in reviewing the extracted clear and 
vague rationales, sentence by sentence, during the privacy 
policies analysis. We only considered clear and vague 
rationales where both researchers agreed on. 
B. Decisions Scenarios 
In this study, we developed a set of scenarios varying over 
three variables: the dangerous permission type, clarity of 
dangerous permission's rationale and clarity of dangerous 
permission's context. The full factorial vignette, which contains 
all the combinations of factors' levels, is 36. However, the 
number of vignettes is too large to be presented to single 
participants. In fact, presenting such large number of vignettes 
to participants might create a risk of boredom or fatigue. In 
addition, cognitive overload is more evident when participants 
have to evaluate numerous vignettes. It was found that after 
around the tenth vignette, participants' attention decreased [20]. 
Hence, we divided the 36 vignettes into 4 blocks with 9 
vignettes each. Participants were randomly assigned to blocks. 
Vignettes were randomly ordered per participant. This is 
important to eliminate possible learning effect.  Below we 
describe the three vignette factors in detail. 
By dangerous permission type we refer to the nine 
categories of dangerous permissions in Android: Calendar, 
camera, contacts, location, microphone, phone, sensors, SMS 
and storage. For the rationale of dangerous permission, we 
used two variations: vague and clear, as detailed in the 
previous subsection. The context of the dangerous permission 
access could be self-explanatory or vague. By self-explanatory, 
we mean the dangerous permission access with obvious and 
immediate triggering action by the app's user. For example, a 
request for accessing the user’s gallery that is prompted when 
















Fig. 1. An example of a permission access screen 
C. Survey Development 
Before running the full survey, the survey was tested by 
two experts. Then, it was piloted with 14 participants varying 
in their technical knowledge. Participants were selected from a 
convenient sample and the survey was updated accordingly. 
Ethical requirements were in accordance with University of 
Glasgow ethical guidelines.  
Following that, participants were presented with the 
Android app's description and provided with initial instructions 
which describe the nature of the tasks. Then, participants were 
presented with scenarios describing different dangerous 
permissions' access with their context and rationales. 
Participants were asked for their disclosure decision "Deny" or 
"Allow". We also enquired about participants' comfort level as 
an additional finding. Comfort level question is a 5-point 
Likert scale, ranging from "Very comfortable" to "Very 
uncomfortable". After that, participants were asked about 
demographic information such as gender, age and educational 
level. They were also asked about their technical knowledge in 
using Android.  
D. Prototype Design 
An example of a permission access screen is shown in 
Figure 1. The same general layout of Android permissions' 
screens was used to match the look-and-feel of permissions' 
screens in real Android apps.  
IV. RESULTS 
In the regression analysis, we modeled users' disclosure 
decisions based on three predictor variables: dangerous 
permission type, clarity of rationale and clarity of context of 
the resource accessed. For dangerous permission type, 
microphone was selected as a baseline category based on 
previous work reporting that microphone permission has the 
highest denial rates compared to other Android permissions 
[18]. The baseline category for clarity of rationale and clarity 
of context is vague. The dependent variable in the model is 
user's disclosure decision, where "allow" is the baseline 
category and "deny" is the target category.  
Table I shows the contribution of each predictor variable to 
the model as well as its statistical significance. The odds ratio 
(OR) column presents each variable's observed effect. The 
values in the OR column can be interpreted as the change in 
odds of disclosure decision for every one unit increase in the 
predictor variable. For example, the odds ratio for sensors 
dangerous permission indicates that for every one unit increase 
on this predictor, the odds of denying dangerous permission 
change by a factor of .403 compared to the baseline, 
microphone dangerous permission, assuming all other predictor 
variables are kept constant. Since the value of OR is less than 
one, this means that the odd is decreasing. In other words, 
users are less likely to deny sensors dangerous permission 
request compared to microphone dangerous permission 
request. Similarly, the odds ratio when the context of 
dangerous permission is clear (self-explanatory) indicates that 
for every one unit increase on this predictor, the odds of 
denying the permission change by a factor of .518 compared to 
when the context is vague, meaning that users are less likely to 
deny dangerous permission requests when the context is clear 
compared to when the context is vague.   For each OR value, 
we chose 95% confidence interval (CI) to determine the 
statistical significance. The CI when the context is clear, for 
example, indicates that the true odds ratio is between .404 and 
.663 with 95% confidence. As can be seen from the table, 
dangerous permission type and clarity of context (p=.000) is 
less than our significance threshold (p=.05), hence these two 
predictors added significantly to the disclosure decision model. 
On the other hand, the clarity of rationale (p=.185) did not add 
significantly to the model. 
 
TABLE I.  SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS OVER DISCLOSURE 
DECISIONS 
Variable Sig. OR 
95% CI for OR 
Lower Upper 
 Dangerous Permission Type .000    
Calendar .113 .656 .390 1.105 
Camera 1.000 1.000 .596 1.677 
Contacts .426 1.234 .735 2.072 
Location .314 .766 .456 1.287 
Phone .113 1.526 .904 2.575 
Sensors .001 .403 .235 .692 
SMS .826 .944 .563 1.583 
Storage 1.000 1.000 .597 1.674 
Clarity of Rationale(Clear) .185 .845 .659 1.084 
Clarity of Context(Clear) .000 .518 .404 .663 
 
With respect to dangerous permission type, as can be seen 
in Figure 2, we observed that 61.34% of respondents who were 
asked to access their phone (phone dangerous permission) 
denied the request. Following phone dangerous permission, 
contacts dangerous permission has the second highest denial 
rates (56.30%). On the other hand, sensors dangerous 
permission has the highest acceptance rates among respondents 
(69.75%), followed by calendar dangerous permission 
(60.50%). 
Regarding clarity of the dangerous permission's rationale, 
surprisingly, differences between clear and vague explanations 
are not statistically significant, as presented in Table I. 
Additionally, Figure 3 visually presents users' disclosure 
decisions. As can be seen, for example, out of all respondents 
who granted dangerous permissions requested, 53.1% were 
presented with clear dangerous permissions' rationales and 
46.9% were presented with vague rationales. Possible 
hypothesis behind users' decisions are illustrated in detail in the 
discussion section. 
For clarity of context, as expected, if the context of 
accessing dangerous permission is clear, users would 
significantly grant more dangerous permissions requests 
(58.20%) than they would do if the context of the resource 
access was unclear (41.80%). Figure 4 reflects the differences 
in users' disclosure decisions. Referring again to Table I, we 
can see that the clarity of context contributes significantly to 
users' disclosure decisions. 
Overall, Users' comfort levels were in line with their 
disclosure decisions. Dangerous permissions with highest 
denial rates have also the highest uncomfortable level, and vice 
versa. For example, in the contacts dangerous permission, 
60.50% selected very uncomfortable or somewhat 
uncomfortable, compared to 27.73% in the sensors dangerous 
permission. When comparing comfort level in relation to 
clarity of dangerous permission's rationale, out of all 
respondents who selected very uncomfortable, 53.2% were 
presented with vague rationales and 46.8% were presented with 
clear rationales. Further, dangerous permissions requests 
scenarios where the context of the resource access is vague are 
associated with higher discomfort levels compared to the clear 
context condition. These results provide additional insights into 
the possible relation between users' disclosure decisions and 
their comfort level, as Android users may be more willing to 
deny uncomfortable dangerous permissions requests. 
Fig. 2. Acceptance and denial percentages per dangerous permission. 
 
















Regarding participants' demographics, of 119 respondents, 
over two-thirds (71%) were male and (29%) female. Just over 
half of the participants aged between 25 and 34 years old. 
Their level of education varied from having high school degree 
or equivalent (14%), some college but no degree (15%), 
associate degree (9%), bachelor degree (52%) and graduate 
degree (10%). Participants also have varied levels of 
employment status, with the majority (83%) being employed. 
Turning to participants' technical background, a minority of 
participants (12%) stated that they use their Android device 8 
or more hours, while most of them (88%) use it 7 or less hours. 
When asked to report their expertise using Android device, 
(50%) regarded their expertise as excellent, (35%) very good, 
(13%) good and (2%) fair. Finally, in response to the question 
about their Android device version, the responses show that the 
majority (90%) are using the new Android run time permission 
system (starting from Android Marshmallow to Android 
version 10). 
V. DISCUSSION 
It has been reported that ambiguity in privacy policy 
sentences can mislead users and increase privacy risks 
accordingly [25]. We found that users grant more permissions 
requests (53.10%) when the provided rationale message is 
clear, compared to (46.90%) when the provided rationale is 
vague. However, the regression analysis found this difference 
to be not statistically significant. A potential explanation is that 
users may pay more attention to the context in which the 
permission request occurred, which reveals the more likely 
rationale, instead of reading the rationale message. Hence, they 
might ignore reading the rationale message if the context of the 
resource access request was clear. Consequently, they could 
rely on the clarity of the context in their disclosure decision 
more than the rationale message. To clarify, a dangerous 
permission request to access the device storage after user 
clicking on "upload photo" button might clearly communicate 
that the app wants to access the storage to upload the photo. 
Therefore, a user might accept the permission request 
according to the clarity of the context without reading the 
rationale message which could reveal other usage purposes. 
Consequently, a user relying on the clarity of the context solely 
may realize that his perception was incomplete when reading 
what the permission will also be used for in the rationale 
message. Taking that into account, developers should follow 
Google guidelines in being transparent and clear about the 
resources accessed and why. 
Related to our work, a previous study [26] examined the 
impact of presenting purposes messages on Apple iOS users' 
behavior. The authors assessed developers provided 
explanations on users' decision making. Participants were 
presented with screenshots of real apps with their rationale 
messages and screenshots of other apps with their rationale 
messages removed. The findings revealed that the approval rate 
when the purposes messages are shown is 73.6%, and 65.8% 
when purposes messages are not shown. The authors reported 
that this difference is statistically significant. This 
demonstrated that users are more willing to accept permissions 
requests when rationale messages are presented. Different to 
our study, the authors did not examine the impact of clarity of 
purposes on users' disclosure decisions.  
Dangerous permission type had a significant effect on 
users' disclosure decisions. Contacts for example had the 
second highest denial rate. One possible explanation is that 
users consider this resource to be highly sensitive. This is 
similar to the findings of [27] in which participants reported the 
sensitivity of the resource to be accessed as the reason of 
denying some permissions requests regardless of whether the 
app needs the permission to function or not.  
Studying the impact of clarity of the context on users' 






























significant. The findings support the previous literature [18,27] 
which noticed that relevance to app's functionality is a main 
reason for granting or denying permissions requests. In fact, 
clarity of the context may uncover the potential related 
functionality and show in real time why the app needs to access 
the dangerous permission. This finding should motivate 
developers to avoid asking all dangerous permissions upfront 
and ask them when needed to give users more contextual 
information that help them in making informed decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this work, we examined the effect of three factors: 
dangerous permission type, clarity of dangerous permission's 
rationale and clarity of dangerous permission's context on 
users' disclosure decisions in the new Android run time model. 
The statistical results emphasize that both dangerous 
permission type and clarity of context have a statistically 
significant effect on users' disclosure decisions. Although 
vague dangerous permissions rationales were associated with 
more denial rates compared to clear rationales, the regression 
analysis found that the clarity of rationale does not contribute 
significantly to users' disclosure decisions.  
The experiment in this paper is limited as participants did 
not install the app on their devices and make disclosure 
decisions in the real world. Future work could include studying 
other factors such as users' privacy concerns.  
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